Throughput-Efficient Dynamic Coalition Formation in Distributed Cognitive Radio Networks by Zaheer Khan et al.
 Throughput-Efficient Dynamic Coalition Formation in 
















Zaheer Khan et al.2010 
This article is published under license to BioMed Central Ltd. This is an open access article distributed under 
the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in 














Aff1 Centre for Wireless Communications (CWC),  University of Oulu,  90 570  Oulu,  Finland
Aff2 CTVR the Telecommunications Research Centre,  Trinity College Dublin,  Dublin 2,  Ireland
Abstract
We formulate the problem of distributed throughput-efficient sensing in cognitive radio (CR) networks as a 
dynamic coalition formation game based on a Markovian model. The proposed coalition formation enables the 
CRs to increase their achievable throughput, under the detection probability constraint, while also taking 
into account the overhead in sensing reports combining. The dynamic model of coalition formation is used 
to express and model the behavior of the coalition forming CRs over time. In the proposed game, CRs 
form coalitions either to increase their individual gains (selfish coalition formation) or to maximize the overall 
gains of the group (altruistic coalition formation). We show that the proposed coalition formation solutions 
yield significant gains in terms of reduced average false alarm probability and increased average throughput per 
CR as compared to the non-cooperative solutions. Given a target detection probability for a coalition, we adopt 
a weighted target detection probability for individual CRs in a coalition. We find that the weighted target 
detection probability for individual CRs results in increased average throughput per CR as compared to when 
each CR is assigned the same target detection probability in a coalition.
1. Introduction
Access to radio spectrum has traditionally been regulated by government agencies. This approach to 
radio spectrum management has been mostly successful in interference avoidance, but at the expense of 
efficiency in overall spectrum utilization. Cognitive radio networks are envisioned to utilize the radio spectrum 
more efficiently through opportunistic access to licensed frequency spectrum. A CR utilizes 
spectrum opportunistically by monitoring the licensed frequency spectrum to reliably detect the licensed 
(primary) user signals and operating whenever the primary user is absent. The detection of primary user signals 
is called spectrum sensing. As with any detection problem, the two types of errors associated with 
spectrum sensing are false alarms and missed detections. The lower the missed detection probability, the 
better the primary user is protected. However, to increase the achievable throughput of the CRs, the false 
alarm probability must also be low. Thus, there exists an inherent tradeoff between protection of primary users 
and achievable throughput for the cognitive radio network [1, 2].
Cooperation in sensing can reduce the false alarm probability of the cooperating CRs [3, 4]. In 
cooperative spectrum sensing, each CR performs spectrum sensing and sends its sensing report to a data 
collector known as the fusion center. To reduce signaling cost, the report may be binary (hard decision), 
consisting of zeros (primary user not present) and ones (primary user present). Hard decisions may be combined 
at the fusion center using, for example, "OR", "AND", and "MAJORITY" rules [1, 2]. However, in distributed 
CR networks, individual CRs need to interact with each other without a centralized fusion center.
This paper formulates the problem of distributed throughput-efficient sensing in cognitive radio networks as 
a dynamic coalition formation game based on a Markovian model. Our model is dynamic in the sense 
that distributed CRs reach self-organizing stable coalition structures (where no two coalitions have an incentive 
to merge) through a time-evolving sequence of steps. We model coalition structures as a sequence of 
random variables describing the state of the CR network, and the transition mechanism between 
coalition structures is modeled as a Markov chain [5–7]. The dynamics of the coalition formation enable us 
to analyze (1) How are the coalitions formed? and (2) How do CRs arrive at equilibrium? We choose a 
coalition formation framework as it provides tools for the radios to decide which coalitions to form to achieve 
their goals more efficiently via cooperation [8–10]. In coalition formation, a coalition is a set of 
distinct, autonomous agents or players which may cooperate in order to increase their individual gains, which 
we call as selfish cooperation . Or they may cooperate 
to maximize the overall gains of the group, which we call 
altruistic cooperation  [11, 12]. A key question 
this paper tries to address is how to coordinate distributed cognitive radios to perform cooperative sensing 
to minimize their false alarm probabilities and therefore increase their achievable throughput, under a probability 
of detection constraint. Our model also takes into account the overhead in combining sensing reports.
Two different game theoretic analyses of distributed cooperative spectrum sensing are presented in [13, 14]. 
In [14], an evolutionary game theoretic framework is used to analyze the interactions among distributed 
selfish CRs in cooperative sensing. It is assumed in [14] that the selfish CRs overhear the detection results 
from the other CRs and can free ride by refusing to take part in spectrum sensing. Hence [14] models 
the spectrum sensing problem as a noncooperative game. Distributed coalition formation for cooperative 
spectrum sensing CRs is the topic of [13]. Using a merge-and-split based coalition formation game model, 
the authors in [13] analyze the average missed detection probability per CR. However, unlike [13], we propose 
a value function that encourages collaborating CRs to minimize their false alarm probabilities for a given 
target primary user detection probability ( ). This is an important requirement for coexistence with primary 
users; otherwise, CRs will not be allowed to operate in the primary user band [15]. Moreover, in contrast with 
[13], the coalition formation model proposed in this paper also takes into account the overhead in 
combining sensing reports within a coalition. In [5], a dynamic coalition formation game based on a 
Markovian model is used to analyze the selfish  interactions among distributed nodes 
for spectrum sharing in an interference channel. Unlike [5], we analyze the interactions among CRs for the 
problem of distributed throughput-efficient sensing in CR networks. Moreover, selfish  
coalition formation proposed in [5] for distributed networks may lead to a suboptimal equilibrium where 
nodes, through their interactions, reach an undesirable coalition structure from a network point of view. Hence, 
we extend the dynamic model of coalition formation proposed in [5] to determine whether and how the 
coalitional behavior of CRs will change if coalition formation is "not entirely selfish".
In this paper, using a coalition game-theoretic framework we devise distributed cooperative strategies for CRs 
that are either selfish or altruistic. We propose a coalition formation model for these CRs to utilize primary 
user spectrum efficiently, under the constraint of a target probability of detection. We take into account the cost 
of distributed cooperative sensing in terms of overhead in combining sensing reports within a coalition. We 
analyze the impact of this cost on the distributed cooperative strategies of CRs. Given a target detection 
probability for a coalition, we also adopt a weighted target detection probability for individual CRs in a coalition 
and analyze its impact on the average throughput per CR. We model the stable network structure that emerged 
as a result of the dynamic coalition formation as the absorbing state of a Markov chain. Using absorbing 
Markov chain theory, we analyze the mean  and the variance  of the time for the game to reach the 
stable coalition structures. We propose a technique to reduce the time taken by the CRs to form a stable 
coalition. Using simulations we assess the performance of the proposed altruistic and selfish coalition 
formation solutions in terms of gains in increased average throughput per CR. We compare these results to 
the throughput achieved by a noncooperative strategy and by the grand coalition (when all the CRs cooperate). 
We also determine average maximum coalition sizes for both altruistic and selfish coalition formation 
solutions. Finally, we evaluate the impact of the distance between the primary user transmitter and the 
distributed CR network on cooperative strategies of the distributed CRs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the system setup, while Section 3 introduces 
the proposed coalition formation game for distributed spectrum sensing. Section 4 introduces the dynamic 
coalition formation model for the proposed game. Section 5 presents simulation results and an analysis of 
the proposed dynamic coalition formation model, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. System Setup
The system setup used in this paper includes a primary user transmitter and a distributed CR network of  
active CRs (transmitter/receiver pairs). The CRs are uniformly and independently distributed in a circle with 
radius  and centered at the coordinates . The PU (primary user transmitter) is at coordinates  as 
shown in Figure 1. This corresponds to, for example, using only downlink frequencies for CR access. The 
primary user and CRs are both assumed to use a time-slotted system with perfect time synchronization, and 
one transmission by primary user corresponds to one time slot, as in [16, 17]. In this approach, the primary user 
is either present for the whole time slot, or absent for the whole time slot. The CRs use the beginning of each 
slot for sensing. We assume that  cognitive radios employ energy detection to make primary user 
detection observations in the frequency band they are monitoring. The probability of primary user present 
is denoted by . In order to detect the primary user, each CR can either sense the spectrum on its 
own (noncooperative strategy) or it can perform cooperative sensing by forming coalitions with other 
CRs (cooperative strategy). 
Figure 1  Topology of a cognitive radio network.
 
Let us represent the received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) from the primary user to the th CR by 
 
(1)
where  represents noise power and  is the signal power received by CR .  is the primary 
user's signal power,  is the distance between the primary user and the th CR,  is the path-loss exponent and  
is a scalar. In our system setup we assume a complex-valued PSK primary user signal and circular 
symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG) noise. For the CSCG noise case the probability of false alarm of CR  for 
a chosen detection threshold  is given by [4, 18] 
 
(2)
where Q() is the tail probability for the standard normal distribution and  represents the time-bandwidth 
product, given as , where  is the sensing duration and  is the measurement bandwidth. For a 
chosen threshold , the probability of detection of CR  is approximated by [4, 18] 
 
(3)
To protect the primary user against harmful interference from the CRs, the detection probability is fixed at 
a desired target value, . In practice,  is required to be close to 1 [2]. The probability of false alarm of each 
CR  for the targeted  can be rewritten as 
 
(4)
It may be seen from (4) that a high detection probability requirement may lead to a high false alarm probability 
for an individual CR if its  is low, thus reducing the achievable throughput of that CR. In this case, the 
individual CRs may interact to form coalitions to help decrease the false alarm probability. Within a 
coalition, sensing decisions by individual CRs are transmitted over the narrowband common control channel to a 
CR selected as a coalition head. Although the optimal decision fusion rule is the Chair-Varshney rule [19], 
for simplicity of implementation we assume that an OR fusion rule is used by the coalition head to combine 
the individual CR sensing decisions within a coalition. The OR rule is a simple decision rule explained as follows: 
if one out of  CRs in a coalition detects the primary user, the final decision for the coalition declares a 
primary user is present, where  represents the number of CRs in a coalition . CRs in any coalition  decide 
to transmit or not, based on the final combined sensing decision of the coalition head. Therefore, the 
probabilities of detection and false alarm of a coalition head are also the probabilities of detection and false 
alarm of each CR  that is the member of .
Assuming that all decisions are conditionally independent (this means that the sensing measurements 
performed by CRs are independent, but that for each CR the same hypotheses ,  not present 
and  present, apply) then using the OR rule, the detection probability of the coalition  is given as 
 
(5)
For a given , the individual CR's target probability of detection in a coalition using OR fusion rule is written 
as (assuming same target probability of detection for every CR, as in [4, 14]) 
 
(6)
The probability of false alarm of each CR  for the  can be written as 
 
(7)
However, it may happen that some of the CRs have better received SNR from the PU than the others. To gain 
from this SNR diversity, we adopt a weighted target probability of detection for any CR . The weighted 
target probability of detection modifies  in (6) and takes a sensing CR's received SNR  into consideration. 
We propose to use weighted target probability of detection for CR  given by 
 
(8)
While we make no claims as to the optimality of the selected weighting method, these probabilities preserve 
the relationship in (5) and assign a higher expectation on detection accuracy to the CRs that experience 
higher SNR. We justify the use of  as follows. For a given SNR  and , false alarm probability of CR  is 
a function of the target detection probability for that CR (see (7) and Figure 2). It can be seen from Figure 2 
that the impact of target detection probability on the false alarm probability of individual CRs varies for 
the different values of . If a CR has high , for instance , then the target detection probability has 
little impact on its false alarm probability. However, if a CR has low , for instance , then the 
target detection probability has strong impact on its false alarm probability. 
Figure 2  Probability of false alarm for different detection probabilities and for different values 
of SNR, .
 
In this approach, the CR with high  is assigned relatively high target detection probability. However, due to 
high , the assignment of high target detection probability has little impact on the false alarm probability of 
that CR. The CR with low  is assigned relatively low target detection probability which results in low false 
alarm probability for that CR (see Figure 2), as compared to when each CR is assigned the same target 
detection probability in a coalition.
The probability of false alarm of each CR  for the  is written as 
 
(9)
Using the OR rule, the false alarm probability  of the coalition  is given as 
 
(10)
It may be seen from (7) and (9) that, for a given  and , the CRs with low values of  have incentives to 
form coalitions as it helps to decrease  (due to the increase in  or  term which in 
turn decreases ). However, for a given  the coalitional false alarm probability given by (10) is an 
increasing function of coalition size .
3. Coalition Game-Theoretic Framework 
for Distributed Cooperative Sensing
Coalition game theory provides useful tools to decide which group of players will cooperate with each other 
to efficiently achieve their goals [8, 20]. Therefore, to analyze cooperative interactions among CRs 
performing distributed spectrum sensing, we model the problem as a coalition game.
3.1. Preliminaries
Let  denote the set of players (CRs) playing the coalition game. A coalition, , is a subset of , 
. An individual non-cooperating player is called a singleton coalition and the set  is called the grand 
coalition, where all players cooperate. The utility of a coalition in a coalition game is called the coalition value, 
and is denoted by . Coalitions are assumed to be non-overlapping, that is, CRs are members of at most 
one coalition.
The most common form of a coalition game is the characteristic function form. In the characteristic function 
form (CFF) of coalition games, utilities achieved by the players in a coalition are unaffected by those outside it.
Definition 1.
A nontransferable utility 
(NTU)  game is a coalition game in CFF, in which the value  of a coalition  cannot be 
arbitrarily divided among the coalition's players. In such games, each player will have its own value within 
a coalition . The value function  represents the value of player  that belongs to a coalition .
3.2. Throughput of a CR
For a noncooperative CR network with periodic spectrum sensing, each slot consists of sensing duration  and 
data transmission duration . To focus on the coalition formation model for the sensing-throughput 
tradeoff problem in distributed CR networks; we assume that the entire primary user band is divided into 
 subbands and, when the primary user is absent each CR operates exclusively in one of the  subbands. (We 
do not analyze scheduling policies in this work and assume a very simple and predetermined orthogonal sub-
band allocation policy for the CRs when the primary user band is free for access. Our ongoing work, outside 
the scope of this paper, addresses competition among CRs for subbands that are free.) This assumption is in 
line with the other models in the literature [14, 21]. For the noncooperative case, the average throughput of 
the CR  is approximated by [1, 14] 
 
(11)
where  is the probability of primary user absent,  represents the total frame length and  represents 
the transmission rate of the CR  to its receiver when the primary user is absent.
In distributed CR networks when CRs decide to perform cooperative sensing by forming coalitions with one 
another they may incur overhead costs in terms of time delay due to the process of coalition formation and due 
to combining sensing reports within a formed coalition. Note that the time delay due to the process of 
coalition formation depends on how frequently the coalition process is initiated which in turn depends on 
changes in the network configuration (for, e.g., CR mobility, etc.). However, the time delay in data transmissions 
of a coalition due to the overhead in combining sensing reports is periodic (since this overhead is incurred in 
every time slot). In this work, we analyze the impact of overhead costs in terms of time spent during 
combining sensing reports on the throughput of distributed CRs. We ignore the overhead in terms of time 
delay due to the process of coalition formation. One of the extensions we envision for our current work is 
the consideration of the effects due to overhead in terms of spending time and resources due to the process 
of coalition formation and also the effects due to overhead in terms of energy consumed by a coalition head 
to collect and combine sensing reports.
When the CRs decide to form a coalition then the entire coalition cannot transmit data until sensing reports 
are collected and the final combined sensing decision is transmitted to all the coalition members (see Figure 
3). One simple method of sensing reports collection by the coalition head can be stated as follows. The 
coalition head grants a contention free channel to individual cognitive radios by polling them (using their 
identity numbers) for transmitting their local decisions. The coalition head may employ a round-robin 
scheduler [22, 23], and on being polled, a CR transmits its local decision to the coalition head. In this 
sensing reports collection method there is cost in terms of time delay in data transmissions of a coalition due to 
the overhead in combining sensing reports. This cost generally increases with the number of coalition forming 
CRs as more decisions need to be reported to the coalition head. The average throughput of the CR  
considering the cost in terms of overhead in sensing reports combining within a coalition is approximated as 
 
(12)
where  is the time spent on reporting a sensing decision to the coalition head. 
Figure 3  Time slot structure with sensing, sensing report combining and data transmission stages.
 
For a target detection probability, , the CRs may form coalitions to reduce their false alarm probability 
and therefore increase their average throughput given by (12). The coalition forming CRs may also increase 
their average throughput by reducing their sensing time  via joint coalitional sensing. However, we note that 
for the distributed spectrum sensing problem when the coalition forming CRs are allowed to vary sensing time , 
it generates significant uncertainties in the coalition values. For instance, if two or more CRs reduce their 
sensing time  (or in other words increase their data transmission time) via forming the coalition  then it 
may happen that the CRs in  start transmitting data while some CRs outside  may still be sensing. This may 
lead to a change in the coalition value (in terms of false alarm probabilities) of the CRs outside the coalition . 
To avoid this uncertainty in the coalition value due to CR transmissions, we fix the sensing duration  for 
each individual CR.
3.3. Coalition Value with Nontransferable Utility
For a target detection probability, , and the fixed sensing duration , the coalition value  must 
characterize the incentives to form coalitions in terms of the decreased false alarm probability  of the 
coalition. Moreover, the coalition value must also take into account the cost in terms of delay in data 
transmissions of a coalition due to the overhead in combining sensing reports. A suitable coalition value 
that satisfies the above requirements is given by 
 
(13)
where  denotes the average throughput for CR  given by (12), for . In the proposed 
coalition formation game, each CR has it is own value within a coalition and its nontransferable due to the 
following reasons.
Indivisible False Alarm Probability
The probability of false alarm  of each CR , where , is also given by the probability of false alarm of 
the coalition , that is,  (as explained in Section 2) and it cannot be divided among the radios.
Indivisible Cost
Each CR incurs the same cost in terms of overhead in combining sensing reports, that is, , and 
this cost cannot be divided among the CRs.
Indivisible Bandwidth
Finally, each CR operates exclusively in one of the  subbands. Therefore, they cannot arbitrarily divide 
the spectrum among themselves.
Therefore, each CR will have its own value within the coalition  and hence, the proposed game is an NTU game.
When two or more CRs form a coalition , then any CR within  is selected as a coalition head to combine 
the individual CR sensing decisions within the coalition. The decisions to form coalitions by the CRs are based 
on consensus, that is, a coalition is formed only if it is acceptable to everyone involved. We also assume that 
CRs are myopic, that is, CRs care only about their current payoffs.
3.4. Selfish Coalition Formation
Definition 2.
Internal stability  means that no CR has an incentive to leave 
its coalition to become a singleton (individual noncooperative CR), that is, , for all .
We assume that CRs are individually rational, that is, CRs seek to maximize their payoffs, conditional on 
feasibility. Therefore, for selfish coalition formation, the merge of two coalitions only occurs when all CRs in 
the new coalition  are at least as well off through the merge as they were before it. Mathematically 
speaking, coalitions  and  will merge to form  only: if for all , where  and ,  
and also . Due to this coalition formation condition, whenever CRs agree to form  the 
new coalition is internally stable , that is, no CR has an incentive 
to become a singleton (an individual noncooperative CR).
3.5. Altruistic Coalition Formation
The model of selfish coalition formation discussed above is in line with much of the coalition formation 
literature, which assumes that users form coalitions to maximize their individual payoffs. However, it is 
equally interesting to investigate the question of whether and how the achievable throughput of CRs will change 
if CRs are assumed to be "not entirely selfish". Intuitively, we want to model the case when two or more 
CRs propose to form a new coalition  by taking into account one another's welfare. Before studying 
altruistic coalition formation, we first define the concept of altruistic contribution of a coalition as follows [11].
Definition 3.
Let  and  be two disjoint coalitions. The 
altruistic contribution  of  to , 
where , is ; the 
altruistic contribution  of  to  
is ; and the sum of 
altruistic contributions  of  and  
is .
In simple words, the altruistic contribution  
of coalition  to  represents the change in the value of the CRs in , when the CRs in  are added to 
the coalition . It can be easily seen that if any proposed coalition  has , then the merger of  and  
to form  would do more good than harm to the overall value of the coalition . Formally, we assume that 
to maximize the achievable throughput of the proposed coalition , an altruistic coalition decides to form 
the coalition  whenever 
 
(14)
4. A Markovian Model of Coalition 
Formation Game
To model all  CR coalitions, we define coalition structures as follows.
Definition 4.
A coalition structure  is a partition of  into exhaustive 
and disjoint subsets, where each subset is a coalition. The set of all possible coalition structures is denoted as .
In this section, we introduce a dynamic model of coalition formation for distributed cooperative spectrum sensing 
in CR networks where multiple distributed CRs coexist and opportunistically access the spectrum. In the 
proposed dynamic coalition formation game the CRs follow a time evolving sequence of steps to reach 
self-organizing stable spectrum sensing coalition structures. Coalition structures in the dynamic coalition 
formation game are modeled as a sequence of random variables describing the state of the system, with 
the mechanism of transitions between coalition structures represented by a Markov chain. To incorporate 
slow changes in the network configuration (for, e.g., due to CR mobility), the initial round of coalition 
formation game restarts some time  after reaching equilibrium. This time  may be assigned according 
to variations in the network configuration. We assume that during one round of coalition formation the 
received primary user's SNR, that is, , and the transmission rate  of each CR  does not change. At the 
very beginning of each round of the coalition formation game, the distributed CR network is composed of 
all singleton coalitions, that is, noncooperative CRs.
4.1. A Coalition Formation Game Model
The coalition formation game involves five steps. The five steps of the proposed model are summarized as follows:
Node Discovery
Discover the CRs within the network.
Initialization
Each individual CR computes its received SNR  from the PU.
Coalition Formation Proposal 
(a) At each time slot, each coalition, with probability , proposes a new coalition structure. In this process, one of 
the CRs in the coalition acts on its behalf. (In the case of singleton coalitions, each singleton coalition, i.e., 
each CR, individually proposes a new coalition structure with some probability ; when two or more CRs form 
a coalition , then any CR within  is selected as a coalition head to propose a new coalition structure with 
some probability  on behalf of that coalition.) (b) The evolution from one coalition structure to the next can 
only occur through the merging of two existing coalitions. For instance, any coalition head of any existing 
coalition  may propose to merge with another coalition , forming .
Coalition Formation Decision 
(a) When the CRs are assumed to be selfish then they form a coalition if for all , where  and 
,  and also . (b) When the CRs are assumed to be altruistic then 
they form a coalition if . (see Sections 3.4 and 3.5 for the details).
Steps (3) and (4) of the coalition formation are repeated until all the coalitions have made their coalition 
formation decisions, resulting in a final stable coalition structure .
Coalitional Spectrum Sensing
Each CR within a coalition computes its local sensing decision and transmits it to the coalition head over 
the common control channel. The coalition head combines the local sensing decisions (including its own 
sensing decision) using an OR decision fusion rule.
The proposed distributed coalition formation can be performed by coalition formation message exchanges 
between CRs over a common control channel. In practice, if all CRs use the same control channel to report 
sensing decisions to their respective coalition heads then the reporting time may increase. To decrease 
the reporting time coalitions may use different control channels. However, since the number of available 
channels in general is limited and the number of coalitions may be large, control channels must be spatially 
reused. For simplicity, we have assumed different reporting channels for each coalition.
4.2. Dynamics of Coalition Formation: Game Model
The dynamic coalition process can be modeled using a Markov chain, with each state representing a 
different coalition structure. A finite set  of all possible coalition structures for  CRs forms 
the state space of the coalition formation game. Our work in [5] provides further detail on this modeling, 
including examples of the Markov chain structure for , and  transmitter/receiver pairs.
4.2.1. Selfish Coalition Formation
Any coalition may propose a coalition structure change to another coalition in the current state , and if all 
the CRs in the proposed coalition are at least as well as before the merge, the game moves to . When each of 
 prevailing coalitions with some probability  proposes a new coalition structure then the transition 
probabilities for the  CR selfish coalition game with coalition structures as state space  are given as 
 
(15)
where  is an indicator function equal to 1 if condition  is satisfied, and zero otherwise,  and  are 
the values of the two coalitions participating in the coalition formation to form the proposed coalition ,  is 
the value of the proposed coalition , and  represents the set of all new possible coalition structure states 
to which coalitions can transit from . The set  is given 
as . Given  
coalitions in the present state , it is possible to transition from  to one of the  possible states, where  
can be calculated as 
 
(16)
For instance, if the number of coalitions , then it is possible to move from the state  to one of 
 different states (besides itself), provided that the coalition formation condition is satisfied. As 
explained previously, two coalitions can merge only if all CRs within the proposed coalition  are at least as well 
off as before the merge. The indicator function  in (15) represents the 
possible agreement or disagreement among the CRs participating in the coalition game to form the 
proposed coalition . As the transition probability at any present state  does not depend upon the prior states 
of the coalition structures, the Markov property holds.
4.2.2. Altruistic Coalition Formation
For the altruistic-cooperation case, the indicator function (coalition formation decision) in (15) is changed 
from  to . It simply means that each CR now decides to merge if 
the merger of two coalitions would do more good than harm to the overall value of the merged coalition .
Using simulation results in Section 5.3 we will compare the performance of the coalition formation based 
on altruistic decision with the selfish decision in terms of average throughput per CR, for different network sizes.
Using standard theory of absorbing Markov chains one can calculate how  long will it take for the process 
to reach stable coalition structures, that is, one can calculate the mean time  and its variance  for the 
dynamic coalition game starting from the initial state of all singleton coalitions to reach stable coalition 
structures (where no two coalitions have an incentive to merge) [5].
In Section 5.3, we analyze the mean  and the variance  of the time for the proposed coalition formation 
to reach the stable coalitions.
5. Dynamic Game Analysis and Simulation Results
To perform the coalition formation, CRs need to exchange their received primary user's signal-to-noise ratio 
(SNR). The amount of information exchange necessary to reach stable coalition structures can be measured by 
the total number of coalition formation proposals sent by the  CRs during the coalition formation process. 
For instance if  number of coalition formation proposals are sent during the entire coalition formation process 
and each proposal requires the exchange of  messages for coalition heads to take a coalition formation 
decision then to reach equilibrium  messages need to be exchanged among the CRs. When we are not 
taking into account the loss of coalition formation proposals due to collisions among distributed uncoordinated 
CRs then in the worst case, that is, where almost all proposals are rejected, the number of proposals is 
only , where . Thus for the worst case, coalition formation proposals can 
be said to be order of . In the best case, that is, where all proposals are accepted and the coalition 
formation leads to the formation of the grand coalition, the number of coalition formation proposals necessary 
is only . Thus for the best case, coalition formation proposals can be said to be order of . In 
practical scenarios the complexity is between these two extremes.
This reduction in the information exchange is due to the reason that when coalitions are formed then instead of 
all the CRs only the coalition heads exchange proposals on behalf of their respective coalition members.
5.1. Stable Coalition Structures
As CRs form self-organizing spectrum sensing coalition structures, we analyze under what conditions the 
coalition formation process will reach a stable coalition structure (where no two coalitions have an incentive 
to merge anymore).
Selfish Coalition Formation
For the proposed selfish coalition formation, a coalition structure state  is an equilibrium state if it satisfies 
the following condition 
 
(17)
or for some .
The above stated condition ensures that no two coalitions in the prevailing coalition structure  have an 
incentive to merge anymore.
The following simple fact proves that the selfish coalition formation process converges to an equilibrium state: 
In the proposed selfish coalition formation, if a certain coalition structure is not an equilibrium state, there 
must exist at least two coalitions that can decide to merge to improve their value functions. As long as such 
two coalitions exist, the coalition structure changes to another coalition structure, until an equilibrium state 
is reached.
Altruistic Coalition Formation
For the proposed altruistic coalition formation, a coalition structure  is an equilibrium state if it satisfies 
the following condition 
 
(18)
Following the same reasoning as we did for the selfish coalition formation process, it is easy to see that 
the altruistic coalition formation process converges to an equilibrium.
5.2. Coalition Sizes
The study of coalition formation in wireless networks has previously focused on cohesive games [24], that 
is, games where the value of the grand coalition formed by the set of all users  is at least as large as the sum 
of the values of any partition of . The authors in [24], also assume that there is no cost to the coalition 
formation process. In such coalition games, coalition structure generation is trivial because the wireless 
nodes always benefit by forming the grand coalition.
However, many coalition game models of wireless node cooperation are not cohesive (see, e.g., [25]). In 
such network scenarios, the network welfare maximizing coalition structure varies.
For the proposed selfish coalition formation where CRs seek to maximize their payoffs, conditional on feasibility, 
it is interesting to note that the higher the  (the signal power received by CR ), the lower the  given by 
(7). CRs with high values of  may have either less or no incentive to cooperate with CRs with low values of  
(or with high ). Hence, cooperation among all CRs is desirable only when all CRs experience similar 
. Therefore, in the proposed coalition formation, the grand coalition of all the CRs may not always form.
For the proposed altruistic coalition formation where CRs seek to merge if the merger of two coalitions would 
do more good than harm to the overall value of the merged coalition, it is interesting to note that the CRs 
with high  values may form coalitions with the CRs having low  values as long as the overall value of the 
newly formed coalition  is increased.
Using simulation results in Section 5.3 we will present average maximum number of CRs per formed coalition 
for both selfish and altruistic coalition formation.
5.3. Simulation Results
Using simulation our aim is to compare the performance (for, e.g., in terms of average throughput per CR) of 
the coalition structure that emerges as the outcome of the proposed coalition formation solutions to 
a noncooperative solution and to the grand coalition.
For simulation illustrations, the following distributed CR network is set up:  CRs are uniformly and 
independently distributed in a circle with radius  m and centered at the coordinates . The 
PU transmitter is at coordinates  as shown in Figure 1. The sensing time  ms, the time-bandwidth 
product is set as , and the frame duration is set to be  ms. We set the path loss exponent . 
The PU power , scalar  and noise power  are set at a value such that  (PU's SNR at CR ) at the 
coordinates  is −15 dB. The probability of primary user present is assumed to be . To 
keep our simulation analysis simple, we assume that all the CRs have the same transmission rate, that 
is,  bits/sec/Hz in (12), where  is signal-to-noise ratio from a CR to its 
receiver. Simulations were performed by "dropping" the CRs randomly around the coordinates . For the 
target detection probability  and , in Figures 4(a) and 4(b), we show the average (averaged 
over the simulation runs) throughput per CR for different network sizes, when all CRs sense 
independently (noncooperative strategy), and when CRs can form coalitions (selfish and altruistic). It can be 
seen from Figures 4(a) and 4(b) that the proposed coalition formation (both selfish and altruistic) yields 
an improvement in the average throughput as compared to the noncooperative solution. However, the 
selfish coalition formation solution leads to a loss in average throughput as compared to the altruistic 
coalition formation solution. In Figure 5, we compare the performance of altruistic and selfish coalition 
formation solutions with the noncooperative solution in terms of average false alarm probability per CR for 
different network sizes. It can be seen that the altruistic coalition formation solution significantly reduces 
the average false alarm per CR, as compared to both selfish coalition formation and noncooperative solutions. 
It can also be seen from Figures 4 and 5 that the weighted target detection probability for individual CRs in 
a coalition results in better average throughput and reduced average false alarm per CR as compared to when 
each CR is assigned the same target detection probability. 
Figure 4  Average throughput per CR for different network sizes and for different scenarios. 
(a) Average throughput (bits/sec/Hz) per CR, ,  m and  in (12) is set to 0.001ms (the time 
spent for reporting a sensing decision to the coalition head). Given a target detection probability for a 
coalition, "same " means that each CR is required to satisfy the same target probability of detection (see 
(7)), whereas "weighted " means that each CR is required to satisfy an SNR-dependent target 
detection probability (see (9)). (b) Average throughput per CR, ,  m and  in (12) is set to 
0.001 ms.
 
Figure 5  Average false alarm per CR for different network sizes, ,  in (12) is set to 0. 001 
ms and  m.
 
When the overhead cost, that is, the cost in terms of collecting and combining sensing reports at the coalition 
head is not taken into account then the altruistic coalition formation solution yields the same results as if all 
the CRs perform cooperative sensing, that is, form the grand coalition, see Figure 6. This is because, for 
no overhead cost, with increasing the number of cooperating CRs, a target detection probability may be 
achieved by having low detection probability at the individual CRs. The low detection probability at the 
individual CRs is translated to a low false alarm probability and therefore increase in throughput. However, 
in practice the reporting of the local CR sensing decisions to the report combining entity (coalition head, 
fusion center, etc.) incurs overhead in the sense that the entire reporting group cannot transmit until all 
the sensing reports are collected and combined by that entity. In the literature (also in IEEE 802.22), polling of 
CRs by the report combining entity is suggested for the collection of sensing reports [3, 23, 26]. This method 
has communication overhead that increases linearly with the number of cooperating CRs. When the overhead 
cost of collecting and combining sensing reports is taken into account (e.g.,  in (12) is set to 1 ms) then it can 
be seen in Figure 6 that the performance of the grand coalition degrades significantly as the number of 
CR increases, as compared to the altruistic coalition formation solution. In Figure 7(a), we compare 
the performance of altruistic and selfish coalition formation solutions in terms of average throughput per CR for 
a network size of 20 CRs. In this figure, we show that for small , the altruistic coalition formation (same 
) solution yields significant average throughput gains when compared with the selfish coalition 
formation solution (same ). However, when  is large then the selfish coalition formation solution (same 
) either outperforms or at least matches altruistic solution (same ) with respect to average throughput 
per CR. This is because the average coalition size for the altruistic coalition formation solution (same ) is 
large as compared to the selfish coalition formation solution (same ), see Figure 7(b), and for large values of 
, the sensing reporting overhead becomes significant. Due to this reason, the large coalitions can be more 
costly as compared to the small ones. 
Figure 6  Comparison of the proposed altruistic coalition formation solution with the grand 
coalition for different scenarios.
 
Figure 7  Average throughput per CR for different network sizes and for different scenarios. 
(a) Average maximum coalition size for selfish and altruistic coalition formation solutions, when the values of 
 (the time spent for reporting a sensing decision to the coalition head) are varied between 0.001 ms to 0.017 
s,  and  m. (b) Average throughput per CR for selfish and altruistic coalition formation 
solutions, when the values of  (the time spent for reporting a sensing decision to the coalition head) are 
varied between 0.001 ms to 0.017s,  and  m.
 
To illustrate the above situation, we can construct an example, for  CRs, where the altruistic 
coalition formation solution (same ) outperforms selfish solution (same ) when  is small. However, for 
the same scenario, when  is set to be large then selfish coalition solution (same ) may outperform 
altruistic solution (same ).
Example 1.
Let ,  and  be the received primary user's SNRs at  CRs. In this three-
CR game, when  ms and assuming  bits/sec/Hz then calculating coalition values 
using (13) and rules explained in Sections 3 and 4 we obtain , , 
, , , 
, . It may be seen that the altruistic 
coalition solution (same ) for this scenario results in the formation of grand coalition  of all 
CRs. However, the selfish coalition solution (same ) results in the formation of either  
or . Since,  is greater than  and , therefore, the 
altruistic solution (same ) outperforms the selfish solution (same ) for this scenario. However, when 
 ms then we obtain , , , 
, , , 
and . It may be seen that the selfish coalition solution (same ) for 
this scenario results in the formation of . However, the altruistic coalition solution (same ) 
results in the formation of either  or . Since,  is greater than 
, therefore, the selfish solution (same ) either outperforms or at least matches altruistic 
solution (same ) for this scenario.
It can also be seen from Figure 7(a) that for very large values of , the altruistic solution (same ) matches 
the selfish solution (same ) in terms of average throughput per CR. This is because for very large values of 
 there are either very little or no gains in terms of average throughput per CR for coalition formation, 
and network structure is mostly composed of individual noncooperative CRs (see Figure 7(b)).
In Figure 8, we vary the parameter  (distance between the primary user base station and the center of 
the distributed CR network, see Figure 1), and show average maximum coalition sizes for the selfish and 
altruistic coalition formation solutions. It can be seen from Figure 8 that for large , the network for such 
scenarios is composed of coalitions of large sizes. In this figure, we also show that for the given simulation 
scenario the altruistic coalition formation solution results in the formation of the grand coalition of all CRs 
whenever  m. As the value of parameter  is decreased, the network for such scenarios is composed 
of independent disjoint coalitions of smaller sizes. It can also be seen from Figure 8 that as the value of 
the parameter  is reduced to 500 m then the coalition formation solution results in a network structure 
mostly composed of individual noncooperative CRs, that is, all singleton coalitions. 
Figure 8  Average maximum coalition size for selfish and altruistic coalition formations, when parameter 
 (distance between the primary base station and the center of the CR network, see Figure 1) is varied between 
0 m to 4500 m,  msec and  CRs.
 
The two figures in Figures 9(a) and 9(b) illustrate the mean and variance of the time for the altruistic 
coalition formation to converge to an absorbing state with different probabilities  of coalition formation 
proposal. In Figures 9(a) and 9(b), simulation results are generated by dropping  CRs in a circle with 
radius  m and centered at the coordinates (2000,0) (other simulation parameters, for instance 
sensing time, slot duration, and so forth, are set to be the same as explained in the beginning of Section 5.3). 
The stable coalition structure that emerges as the outcome of the coalition formation may be different for 
the different drops of CRs in the distributed CR network. Therefore, we evaluate the mean and variance of the 
time to converge to the stable coalition structure (absorbing state) for any single random drop. For the 
target detection probability  and  ms, when CRs propose altruistic coalitions with some 
probability  then the process converges to the grand coalition (absorbing state for a single random drop for 
the given simulation scenario). The mean and variance of the time to converge to the grand coalition are 
evaluated for different  as follows: We repeat the coalition formation for the same drop of CRs with 
different probability  of coalition formation proposal. Figure 9(a) shows that for small ,  is high because 
the mean time between coalition formation messages is too long. If  is too high then the mean time 
between coalition formation messages is shorter but the number of coalition message collisions is higher, 
resulting in a longer time between coalition structure changes. This suggests that depending on the number 
of radios in the game there is an optimum value for . We illustrate this optimum value for  CRs in Figure 9(a). 
Figure 9  Mean time and its variance for the altruistic coalition formation of  CRs to form 
the grand coalition (absorbing state for a single random drop for the given simulation scenario) 
from the transient state of all singleton coalitions for different probabilities  of coalition 
formation proposal. The dwell time in each state is set to 0.001 ms.
 
6. Conclusions
We apply a coalitional game-theoretic framework to the study of stable network partitions for the problem 
of distributed throughput-efficient sensing in cognitive radio (CR) networks. We devise distributed 
cooperative strategies for cognitive radios that are either selfish or altruistic. We propose a coalition 
formation model for these CRs to utilize primary user spectrum efficiently, under the constraint of probability 
of detection. The proposed coalition formation model also takes into account the overhead in sensing 
reports combining. We demonstrate that when each CR is assigned the same target detection probability in 
a coalition then for small to moderate values of sensing reporting time, the altruistic solution yields significant 
gains in terms of average throughput per CR as compared to the selfish and noncooperative solutions. 
However, for large values of sensing reporting time, the selfish solution either outperforms or at least 
matches altruistic solution in terms of average throughput per CR. We then adopt a weighted target 
detection probability for individual CRs in a coalition. We find that the weighted target detection probability 
for individual CRs results in higher average throughput as compared to when each CR is assigned the 
same individual target detection probability in a coalition. We also find that when CRs are assigned weighted 
target detection probabilities in a coalition then the altruistic coalition formation solution significantly increases 
the average throughput per CR, as compared to noncooperative solution, selfish coalition formation, and the 
grand coalition of all CRs. Our work employs an absorbing Markov chain model to model the equilibrium 
state (where no two coalitions have an incentive to merge) of the proposed coalition formation. Using a 
Markovian model of the coalition game, we analyze the dynamics of the coalition formation game and the 
stability of different network partitions in a distributed cognitive radio network. We also analyze the mean  
and variance  of the time for the game to reach the stable coalition structures. Finally, we also show the 
impact of the distance between the primary user transmitter and the distributed CR network on 
cooperative strategies of the distributed CRs.
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